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Right to Reverse Engineer Software: Is Japan Next
and Does It Really Matter?t
I. Introduction
Although computer programmers may see software as a form of
art' and worthy of high levels of protection,2 copyright laws around the
world are converging on a more pedestrian viewpoint. 3 Following the
lead of the United States4 and the European Community, 5 Japan is
considering delimiting the rights of software producers by allowing
purchasers to reverse engineer computer programs. 6
The proposal has serious ramifications for bilateral trade.
Software is one of the few industries in which the United States is an
international colossus, accounting for seventy-eight percent of world-
wide sales 7 and fifty-five percent of sales inJapan.8 The success of most
foreign products in Japanese markets is dismal by comparison.9 One
of the reasons for the success of U.S. software producers in Japan has
t This Comment has been entered in the 1994 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1 "The programmer, like the poet, works only slightly removed from pure thought-
stuff. He builds his castles in the air, from air, creating by exertion of the imagination."
ANHr-oNY L. Ct.APES, So-rwARs 10 (1993) (quoting FREDERICK T. BROOKS, THE MYTH-ICAL MAN-
MONTH 7 (1975)). See alsoJohn Markoff, Software Offers Solid Future, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1990,
§ 3, at 29. "Producing great software isn't engineering, it's an art form. I find that musicians
and philosophy students often make the best programmers." Id. (quoting Charles Wang,
Chairman of Computer Associates).
2 See generally CLAPES, supra note I (arguing that the non-literal aspects of computer
software deserve higher protection than that afforded in recent decisions); Note, Copyright
Law-Scope of Protection of Non-Literal Elements of Computer Programs-Second Circuit Applies "Ab-
straction-Filtration-Comparison" Test, 106 HARv. L. REV. 510, 511 (1992) (arguing that the ab-
straction-filtration-comparison "test will discourage innovative programming techniques and
leave non-literal elements of computer programs under-protected.").
3 See infra notes 3743 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nature of software.
4 See infra notes 44-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.S. law.
5 See infra notes 139-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of European Commu-
nity law.
6 See infra Part II for a discussion of the Japanese proposal and the U.S. response to it.
7 See Negotiators Make No Progress in Intellectual Property Talks, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 1, at 10 (Jan. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Negotiators). By itself, Microsoft has achieved incredi-
ble success. Worldwide there are 140 million personal computers, 90% of which use either
Microsoft's DOS or Windows operating systems. See Mark II, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 81.
8 See Barshefsky Says Foreign Chip Market Share in Japan to Decline in 1993 Third Quarter, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2121 (Dec. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Barshefsky].
9 Foreign (non-Japanese) penetration ofJapanese markets hovers around 20% in semi-
conductors. Id. In telecommunications the figure is 5%, while for insurance it is 2%. U.S.-
Japan Trade Talks Making Progress, USTR Official Says, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at
2142 (Dec. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Trade Talks].
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been the latter's failure to produce good software. 10 Thus, in the
words of one U.S. software industry official, the right of reverse engi-
neering might mean that Japan "could instantly produce software that
they have not had the ability to write themselves."" t
Moreover, the proposal arrives amidst the continuing problem of
worldwide infringement of U.S. copyrights on software, which industry
representatives say amounts to billions of dollars in losses worldwide,
including three billion dollars per year in Japan. 12 Compared to the
total sales of the biggest U.S. software producers, such losses are mas-
sive. In 1993 IBM posted software sales of almost three billion dol-
lars,18 while Microsoft's sales were closer to four billion dollars.' 4
Perhaps the best reason for concern is what the timing of the pro-
posal may signal to American software companies. Japan is currently
wallowing in its worst recession in fifty years. 15 Faced with recessions in
the past, Japan often increased its exporting efforts to lift its economy
out of a morass.' 6 With the global demand for software so high, and
Japan's market share so low, a burst of software production by Japan
would give the Japanese economy, in theory, a positive jolt. A broad
right to reverse engineer computer programs could give Japanese
programmers inspiring insight into the world's most successful
software. 17 Yet the position that various members of the Clinton Ad-
ministration have urged Japan to adopt is inconsistent with current
10 The best-selling piece of Japanese business software, Ichitaro, was written over ten
years ago. See Japan to Draft Guidelines on Computer Software Copyrights, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA),
Feb. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, BNAITD File.
11 T.R. Reid & Peter Behr, A Software Fight's Blurred Battle Lines; U.S. Computer Companies
Are on Both Sides as Japan Considers Copyright Law Changes, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1994, at DI
(quoting Marshall C. Phelps, Jr., Vice President of IBM).
12 See id. The rate of piracy, the ratio of illegal copies to total copies, is claimed to be
92% in Japan. Id. Other notorious infringers include Korea (yearly losses of $315 million,
88% piracy rate), Korea to Step Up Protection to Avoid Special 301 Designation, Official Says, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 528 (Mar. 31, 1993), France ($1.2 billion losses, 73%
piracy rate), and the United States ($1.9 billion losses). See Software Firms Lost $11 Billion Due
to Illegal Copying, Group Says, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA),June 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, BNAITD File.
By continent, Asia accounted for losses of $5.4 billion, while in Europe losses totaled
$4.5 billion. Id. (The figures do not add up: the sum of losses among Asia, Europe, and the
United States is $11.8 billion, $800 million more than the claimed worldwide total.) The
source of the figures is the Business Software Alliance (BSA). Id. For a discussion of BSA, see
infra notes 22, 26-31 and accompanying text.
In 1989, the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated general copyright losses at
$25 billion per year. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and Adminis-
tration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990).
13 See Steve Lohr, Company Reports; IBM Has First Profit in a Year, N.Y. TIM.S, Jan. 26,
1994, at DI.
14 See Brian Dumaine, America's Smart Young Entrepreneurs, FORTUNE, Mar. 21, 1994, at 37.
The exact figure is $3.753 billion. Id.
15 See Labour Pains, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 12, 1994, at 75.
16 See Special Report Trade Negotiators Turn Eastward, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at
105 (Jan. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Special Report].
17 Absent reverse engineering, discovering the ideas and programmer's tricks that un-
derlie a piece of software is extremely difficult. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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U.S. law on reverse engineering.18
This Comment discusses the context of the Japanese proposal and
the response it provoked within both the industry and the Clinton Ad-
ministration in Part II. In Part III, the Comment briefly describes
some programming concepts and the scope of reverse engineering.
The law of both the United States and the European Community (EC)
is discussed in Parts IV and V. In Part VI, the Comment concludes that
the Japanese proposal is far less of a threat to the U.S. software indus-
try than the domestic threat of overly broad applications of various
U.S. copyright doctrines to infringement cases.
II. Japanese Proposal; U.S. Response
On July 22, 1993, the Japanese Agency of Cultural Affairs an-
nounced that it was studying the possibility of amending Japanese
copyright law to allow software users to reverse engineer or decompile
computer programs.1 9 The proposal came less than two weeks after
the United States and Japan announced plans for future negotiations
over measures to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with Japan, which
topped forty-nine billion dollars in 1992.20
The proposal represented something of a reversal of the Japanese
stance on computer software. Weeks prior to the reverse engineering
initiative, the Japanese Agency of Cultural Affairs had proposed in-
creased restrictions on the use of computer software and greater en-
forcement of a law forbidding the removal of copy protection
schemes. 21
Despite the potential impact of the proposed measure, the re-
sponse of U.S. government and industry was belated.2 2 In November
1993, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and U.S. Trade Representative
18 See infra Parts II and IV.B. But see Bob Rossi, A Brash, New Voice for the IP Arena, RE-
CORDER, Feb. 17, 1994, at 1 (Patent and Trademark Commissioner Bruce Lehman "has main-
tained that U.S. copyright law prohibits [reverse engineering] under all but a few
circumstances."). The U.S. Assistant Commissioner for External Affairs at the Patent and
Trademark Office, Michael Kirk, on the other hand, says that the only two U.S. cases to
address the issue of reverse engineering "were exceptions." See Andrew Pollack, U.S. Pro-
testing Japan's Plan to Revise Software Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1993, at D2.
19 See Negotiators, supra note 7, at 10.
20 See U.S., Japan Reach Framework Agreement Aimed at Reducing Japan's Trade Surplus, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1150 (July 14, 1993); Special Report, supra note 16, at 105.
One year later, the trade deficit had climbed to around $60 billion, worsening trade
relations between the two countries. See Ruth Marcus & Peter Behr, U.S., Japan Talks on Trade
Collapse; Clinton Silent on Possible Sanctions, WASH. PosT, Feb. 12, 1994, at Al.
21 See Japan Government Weighs Restrictions on Software Copying by Individuals, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1128 (July 7, 1993).
22 According to Robert Holleyman, president of the Business Software Alliance, which
includes industry powerhouses suich as IBM, Microsoft, Lotus, and Apple, the United States
did not learn of the proposal until September 1993. See Barshefsky, supra note 8. In July 1993,
however, the proposal was announced in the Japanese equivalent of the Wall Street Journa
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. See Robert Patton, Soflwars, Sci. Am., Apr. 1994, at 1.16. According to
another source, IBM first learned of the proposal informally and alerted other U.S. concerns.
See Reid & Behr, supra note 11, at D1.
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Mickey Kantor complained in a letter to the Japanese Trade Minister
that the Agency's proposal conflicted with the spirit of the July trade
negotiations. 2 3 In early December, Charlene Barshefsky broached the
matter in Tokyo at the ongoing bilateral negotiations on intellectual
property, 24 while at an even higher level, U.S. Ambassador Walter F.
Mondale voiced his opposition to the proposal directly to Japanese Ed-
ucation Minister Ryoko Akamatsu.25
Unlike the Clinton Administration, the U.S. computer industry is
split on the matter. The Business Software Alliance (BSA), like the
U.S. government, opposes the Japanese proposal,26 while the Ameri-
can Committee for Interoperable Systems (ACIS) favors it.27 ACIS
comprises thirty companies whose primary function in the computer
industry is the manufacture of hardware. ACIS contends that the right
to reverse engineer will permit hardware manufacturers to achieve
compatibility with software more easily.28 Under the current regime in
Japan, ACIS says, Japanese hardware makers have closed American
companies from the market by refusing to divulge the hardware speci-
fications necessary to make Japanese software run properly. 29
BSA, on the other hand, comprises software producers,30 who
worry that if Japanese software makers have free access to the ideas
underlying American software, they will be able to produce competing
software at a lower price than American firms.31
The U.S. government has taken the side of BSA and has pressured
Japan repeatedly not to adopt the reverse engineering measure. On
December 13, 1993, the Japanese Agency of Cultural Affairs held a
hearing on the matter. Testifying were members of the U.S. software
industry and officials from both the Patent and Trademark Office and
the Department of Commerce.3 2 The hearing occurred amidst the
"economic framework talks" between the United States and Japan.
While the general trade talks appeared successful,3 3 talks on intellec-
tual property went nowhere.3 4 These negotiations were followed in
February 1994 by the U.S.-Japanese Economic Summit, which was also
23 See Pollack, supra note 18, at D2.
24 See Barshefsky, supra note 8, at 2121.
25 See Merrill Goozner, Businesses'Expectations Ebb in 'UnexcitingJapan,' CH. Tim.,Jan. 2,
1994, at Cl; Reid & Behr, supra note 11, at Dl.
The Ministry of Education is head of the Cultural Affairs Agency, which originated the
proposal. See Barshefsky, supra note 8, at 2121.
26 See Barshefsky, supra note 8, at 2121.
27 See Bob Rossi, A Brash, New Voice for the IP Arena, RECORDER, Feb. 17, 1994, at 1.
28 See Reid & Behr, supra note 11, at D1.
29 See id.
30 Some ACIS members produce software, but not nearly as much as BSA members.
BSA claims that its U.S. software sales total $17.7 billion, nearly 700 times those of ACIS
members. See Barshefsky, supra note 8, at 2121.
31 See id.; Special Report, supra note 16, at 105.
32 See Barshefsky, supra note 8, at 2121.
33 See Trade Talks, supra note 9, at 2142.
34 See Negotiators, supra note 7, at 10.
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The reverse engineering issue, of great importance to the United
States and on which Japan is presently silent, will most likely surface
again by the July 1994 meeting of the G-7.36 The soundness of the U.S.
position is discussed in Part VI.
11. Computer Programs and Decompilation
The law of reverse engineering of computer software is most often
cast in terms of "decompilation."37 Decompilation, however, is only
one form of reverse engineering. Generally, there are several levels of
computer programming. Before anything happens, the programmer
conceives of a task. To accomplish this task, he writes an algorithm.
An algorithm is the most abstract level of programming and may exist
only on paper or even in the programmer's head. To average a batch
of numbers, for example, the computer must add the numbers, then
divide the total by the number of numbers. The algorithm for this
simple task may look like this:
Begin program
Count = 0; total = 0
Input no. to computer
Add no. to total
Add 1 to count
Another no.? Yes
No.
Avg. = Total/Count
The trick in programming is to convert the algorithm into a run-
ning program. The brains of the computer lie in the microprocessor,
a large chip that operates on electrical impulses. Each impulse is
either a zero or a one, which equates to a transistor state of either off
or on. Each piece of data that comes through the microprocessor
must come as a stream of zeros and ones. Therefore, before the al-
gorithm in the above diagram can be implemented by the computer, it
must be translated into a form recognized by the microprocessor.
First, the programmer must convert the algorithm into source
code. Source code is less intelligible to programmers than an al-
gorithm, but is fairly readable nevertheless. 38 Source code, like human
speech, comes in languages, such as BASIC, C, or Pascal. Unlike
35 See Marcus & Behr, supra note 20, at Al.
36 See Special Report, supra note 16, at 105.
37 In Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), defendant used plaintiff's
computer program, which was in object code, to generate source code. Id. at 1514-15. The
Sega court blurs the distinction between decompilation and reverse engineering, id. at 1514,
and between compiling and assembling, id. at 1514 n.2.
In the European Community, the recent computer software directive refers specifically
to decompilation. See Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
38 In Pascal, the algorithm above may be implemented as follows:
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human speech, however, the lexicon of a particular program is really
just an instruction set that is severely limited by syntax.
The program may next be assembled. 39 Assembled source code is
written in assembly language. The vocabulary of assembly language is
even more limited than that in source code, and the instructions are
shorter. The form of the program, moreover, is ultimately dictated by
the constraints of the microprocessor, such as its memory size and loca-
tion, instruction set, and protocol. Although alphanumeric, assembly
language is for the most part indecipherable. 40 Note that assembly
code is not yet intelligible to the computer, which can read only ones
and zeros.
Finally, the program must be compiled. Compiling entails con-
verting the assembled program into a stream of ones and zeros. Con-
ceptually, this phase is not difficult. Each assembly command, e.g.,
MOV, is assigned a number that is expressed in binary. (The binary
representation of the number 13, for example, is 1101.) The ADD
command may be assigned 0101, while AX (a data register in the
microprocessor's memory) is 10 and BX is 01. Thus, the command
"ADD AX, BX" is compiled as 01011001. This is object code, also
known as machine code because it is intelligible to the computer.
To disassemble a program is to convert the compiled object code
program Average;
Var
count: integer;
ans char;
N, avg, total : real;
begin
count: = 0;
total : = 0;
repeat
Write ('Enter a number: ');
Readln (N);
count: count + 1;
total = total + N;
avg : = total / count;
Write ('Another number? (y or n)');
Readln (ans)
until (ans = 'n') or (ans = 'N');
Writeln ('The average is ',avg)
end.
39 A program need not be assembled. Assembly language is mentioned because disas-
sembly-converting object code into assembly language-is easier than decompiling-con-
verting object code into source code. When speed of execution is necessary, programmers
often turn to assembly language. See JOHN NORTON & PHILLIP SOCHA, ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE
FOR THE IBM PC xiii-xiv (1986) ("Typical assembly language programs are two to three times
as fast as equivalent C or Pascal programs.").
40 An assembled program is generally a long set of steps that might appear as follows:
MOV DX, SS: [BX + 2]
XOR BX, BX
MOV CX, Count
JCXZ SD4
CMP Data [BX], AX
JL SD2
CMP Data [BX],DX
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into assembly language, which is more readable than just ones and ze-
ros. Decompiling entails converting a program from object code into
source code. Disassembling and decompiling are both forms of re-
verse engineering software, as they each offer insight into the ideas
that underlie the object code. The distinction is often ignored in dis-
cussions of copyright, but it is helpful conceptually. 4'
When commercial software vendors release programs, they often
release only the object code (ones and zeros). The reason is fairly
straightforward. The computer understands and operates only on ob-
ject code, so the source code is not necessary to the physical execution
of the software. As far as the vendor is concerned, releasing the source
code is not only superfluous, but dangerous. Often programmers have
devised tricks, shortcuts, or innovative subroutines that increase the
efficiency of the program or make it more pleasing to the eye. Also,
the software may contain data in the nature of trade secrets, such as
empirically determined parameters or constants. 42 Innovations of this
sort make the software more marketable, but come at a cost. A com-
petitor who learns these secrets could market the same software at a
lower price. It is not surprising that software producers want to shield
these secrets. If the source code is included with the object code, these
secrets will be transparent to a user who knows what he is looking for
in the code. But when such information is buried deep within an end-
less stream of object code, it is effectively encrypted.43
IV. American Law
In the United States, the judicial development of copyright protec-
tion for computer software began in the late 1970s.4 4 After settling on
41 See supra note 37.
42 See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
43 The object code version of the number-averaging program above is about 4400 bytes.
A byte comprises eight bits, so that the object code is over 17,000 bits-ones and zeros. "The
earliest cases dealing with similarity in coded programs reflect inadequate development of
the idea-expression distinction. The earliest relevant case was a district court opinion in
Synercom Technologies v. University Computing Co." RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1,08[2] (1985). See Synercom, 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
44 Congress has also advanced the copyright law governing computer software. The
term "computer program" first appeared in the copyright statute in 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1976).
In 1980, Congress added section 117, which recognizes two realities of software. First,
for the purchaser of software to run it on a computer, he must make a copy of it in the
computer's random access memory (RAM). Second, computer glitches sometimes erase the
program itself, so a backup copy is a necessary form of insurance. The right to make a copy
of a program for these two purposes was thus granted. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988). Without
these rights, the mere use of the program or making of a backup copy would infringe the
right of reproduction. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988).
Congress also responded to abuses. In copyright law, the first sale doctrine limits the
copyright holder's distribution right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), to the first sale, after which the
owner of the physical copy may dispose of the copy at his pleasure, whether by loan, resale, or
rental. A software rental industry soon mushroomed. A rental outfit would purchase the
software from the copyright owner, say IBM. It would then rent the software to patrons for
1994]
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the view that computer programs may be copyrighted whether in the
form of source code or object code,4 5 courts next wrestled with the
appropriate method of proving infringement. 46
Absent direct proof of copying, which is rarely the case, the stan-
dard formula for infringement is access plus substantial similarity. 47
The second method of proof is inferential. If the defendant had access
to the plaintiff's work, and the allegedly infringing work is substantially
similar to the first, the court (or jury) may find that copyright infringe-
ment has occurred 4 8 -the defendant copied the plaintiffs work and
violated his exclusive right of reproduction. As access to mass mar-
keted software is fairly easy to prove, the courts were left to decide what
constitutes substantial similarity. 49
Recently, U.S. courts have begun to trim back the copyright pro-
tection of computer software. The motivating force behind this devel-
opment is the distinction between ideas, which are not protectable,50
and expression, which is.5 1 Although the distinction is impossible to
formulate definitively, Judge Learned Hand put forth a classical con-
struct to visualize the range between idea and expression in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.52 Lying between expression and idea, Hand
one or two nights for a fraction of the actual purchase price. As anyone who has worked with
it knows, commercial software cannot be mastered in a night, so the likely purpose of the
rental was to copy the software. The copyright holders had no cause of action against the
rental outfits, which were exercising their rights under the first sale doctrine. Congress thus
carved out an exception to the doctrine, prohibiting the owners or possessors of software
from "rental, lease, or lending" of it. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1) (A) (Supp. III 1991).
45 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983);
Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l,
Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
The point seems obvious now, but at the time the debate was alive, many good argu-
ments were advanced against copyrighting computer programs at all. See, e.g., Pamela Samu-
elson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-
Readable Form, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663. One of the staple arguments was that "bringing new ideas
into the public domain was the quid pro quo the public received in the exchange for the
limited monopoly right the author received to protect his or her expression of the ideas." Id.
at 705-06.
Arguments on the subject, of course, date back to the time when computers were in
their infancy. See, e.g., Stephen P. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 340-50 (1970).
46 See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn.
1985); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
47 See, e.g., Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc. 12 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir.
1994).
48 See, e.g., Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 8 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1994).
49 See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)
(applying Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), directly to computer software and concluding
that a program's overall function was its idea and that its structure, sequence, and organiza-
tion were protectable expression). For a brief discussion of Baker, see infra notes 58-60.
50 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
51 See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1030 (1994). (citing Feist Publica-
tions v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)). The copyright statute extends
protection to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... "
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
52 45 F.2d 119 (1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
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said, is a series of abstractions "of increasing generality." 53 Thus, the
text of a play is copyrightable, while its plot is not.54 The challenge in
software cases has been to apply the abstractions test to computer
code. Designed to carry out a programmer's idea in the circuitry of a
computer, source code is an inevitable blend of idea and expression;
all of it must be written not only with the computer specifications in
mind,55 but with the goal of efficiency. 56
Copyright law has many doctrines that limit the protection of ex-
ternally driven expression. 57 The principle that expression, but not an
idea, is protectable emerged in this setting.58 The plaintiff in Baker v.
Selden developed a method of implementing double-entry bookkeep-
ing on one or two pages. The defendant copied this system and mar-
keted his own book of accounting forms, which differed from those
shown by the plaintiff as examples. The U.S. Supreme Court held for
the defendant, reasoning that the plaintiff could not protect the ex-
pression, (accounting forms) necessarily incidental to his accounting
system, which was not protectable by copyright.59 The Baker holding,
that ideas and systems may not be copyrighted, has since been codified
in U.S. law. 60
A related doctrine is that of merger, which holds that when an
idea may be expressed in a limited number of ways, the expression
merges into the idea and is not protectable. 61 In Morrissey v. Proctor &
Gamble Co.,6 2 the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that sweepstakes
rules on a card were of necessity so brief as to permit only a limited
number of expressions and thus were not copyrightable. The effect of
allowing copyright protection in such cases would be to grant a de
53 Id. at 121.
54 Id.
55 In a version of Pascal called Turbo Pascal 4.0, for example, the largest value an inte-
ger variable can take is 32,767. TuRBO PASCAL OWNER'S MANUAL (Borland ed., 1987).
56 Code is efficient to the extent that it accomplishes a given task with the fewest bits
(ones and zeros) of object code. The notion that efficiency is the preeminent goal of pro-
gramming has been challenged lately. Many programmers believe that because programs
must be updated continually as new versions of software are released, clarity is an equally
important goal. See, e.g., Sid L. Huff, Object Oriented Programming; Info Tech, Bus. Q., Dec. 22,
1993, at 85.
57 The concept of externally driven expression may be illuminated by comparing the
author who writes free form poetry with the one who must write the instructions for affixing a
stamp to an envelope. In the latter case, many real world or physical considerations will
dictate the expression. For example, one cannot apply pressure to the stamp before it has
been moistened. If a second author also writes instructions for putting a stamp on an envel-
ope, certain similarities will result as a matter of course.
58 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
59 Id. at 104-05.
60 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). "In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id.
61 See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971)
(idea of a jeweled bee pin held to have merged with its expression).
62 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
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facto monopoly on the idea. The doctrine often determines the out-
come of cases where instructions63 or linguistic economy 6 4 drive the
expression. Both settings are applicable to computer code.
The scenes a faire doctrine 65 governs shopworn conventions, which
fail the originality standard. 66 Conventions evolve in many settings.
Fairy tales begin with "Once upon a time." College profiles invariably
contain information about tuition, fees, majors, entrance exam scores,
housing, and meal plans. When these conventions first originate, of
course, they are original. Over time, however, they become hackneyed
and are no longer copyrightable.6 7 The computer science culture has
exploded in a short period of time, and the scenes a faire doctrine is
now commonplace in computer software cases.68 With thousands of
computer scientists writing programs in the most efficient manner pos-
sible for a relatively small number of computer systems, the conver-
gence to certain conventions was perhaps inevitable. 69
Scenes a faire may limit copyright protection in a second setting
that is similar, yet seemingly distinct. A roguish knight may be a stock
character in a play about the Middle Ages, 70 but his inclusion is not
necessary to the work. This is not true for many pieces of software
written to perform a specific task. Here the inclusion of certain data or
63 See id.
64 Compare Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (holding that as a compilation, a card with five facts about an
investment bond lacked sufficient originality for protection) with Kregos v. AP, 937 F.2d 700
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a pitching form with nine statistics about a starting pitcher was
copyrightable subject matter).
65 The scenes afaire doctrine was introduced to American copyright law in Cain v. Uni-
versal Pictures Corp., 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
66 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). The Supreme Court has stated recently that in addition
to the requirement that copyrightable expression originate in the author and not be copied
from a pre-existing source, it must also exhibit a modicum of creativity. Feist Publications v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991).
67 The scenes afaire doctrine originally had a more restricted meaning. From Cain until
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976), the doctrine withheld protection from expression that "necessarily results from the fact
that the common idea is only capable of expression in more or less stereotyped form" by not
including the expression in the substantial similarity analysis. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
Since Reyher, the doctrine has expanded to include stock scenes. See Leslie A. Kurtz,
Copyright: Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REv. 79 (1989).
Learned Hand, however, saw the danger of withholding protection from a hackneyed
cliche, which, though unoriginal in the sense that the idea is obvious, may be expressed in
myriad ways. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Picture Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1936)
("[A]nticipation as such cannot invalidate a copyright.").
68 See, e.g., Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying
scenes a faire to a home computer video game).
69 Windows, pull-down menus, and icons are all examples of standards that have
emerged.
70 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1931). "If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer
might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough
that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of
the household . . . ." Id. at 121.
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subroutines may be mandatory. As a result, any program written to
perform a specific task necessarily bears strong similarities to other
such programs. At least one court has said that the scenes a faire doc-
trine bars protection in such instances, at least to the extent of protect-
ing necessary elements in the program.7' This second setting is a
subset of the first: an element that is common to a genre of work may
not be necessary, but a necessary element will perforce be common.
The second defense has been deemed the externalities defense.72
Writing computer programs (or compiling databases) is labor in-
tensive, 73 so it is not surprising to find advocates for the sweat of the
brow doctrine, which holds that the labor wrapped up in a work ought
to be protected by copyright.74 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has
explicitly rejected this notion.75
Despite the array of names, these doctrines reflect only two basic
copyright principles codified by U.S. law. First, a copyright extends
protection to a work's expression; any ideas, processes, or systems 76
contained in a work are not protectable. Second, expression must be
original to earn copyright protection. 77
These principles are deceptively simple, and two points are worth
noting. First, the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement that the
originality standard is low but not zero 78 is helpful only at the level of
literal expression: the defendant in Feist made exact copies of the
plaintiff's phone book. The Court looked to the nature of the work
(an alphabetized list of names accompanied by addresses and phone
numbers) and held that the compilation was so mechanical as to be
void of any originality.7 9 The Court did not need to venture into the
murky region of nonliteral expression, where originality is more diffi-
cult to define. The scenes afaire doctrine is one limit on the protection
of nonliteral elements, but has not been developed fully.
71 See Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256,
1262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987) (holding that software which analyzes cotton
markets by necessity contains certain facets, which are thus not protectable).
72 See id. The court noted that "many of the similarities between [plaintiff's and defend-
ant's] programs are dictated by the externalities of the cotton market" and were thus similar
to unprotectable computer input formats. Id. at 1262 (citing Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978)).
73 That is, the cost of the inputs is dominated by labor costs as opposed to the capital
costs, which are comparatively minimal. This does not mean that market entry is easy, how-
ever. "It can cost hundreds of millions of dollars to develop a new computer operating sys-
tem and get the product established on the market." Computer Executives Maintain Industry
Generally Enjoys Healthy Competition, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1635, at 490 (Oct.
14, 1993) (quoting Paul Johnson, Vice President of the Equity Research Department of First
Boston Corporation).
74 See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd,
650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
75 See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991).
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
77 Id. § 102(a).
78 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359.
79 Id.
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The second (and related) point is that courts may use two legal
devices to withhold protection from expression. They can say that the
plaintiffs expression fails the two standards set by section 102 (no pro-
tection of ideas or systems, nor of unoriginal expression); or they can
say that certain aspects of the defendant's work necessarily bear simi-
larities to the plaintiffs work and are not dispositive of whether copy-
ing has occurred.80 Either way, these aspects of plaintiff's expression
are left unprotected.
Though seminal, Judge Hand's abstractions test is inadequatio in
the face of so many programming considerations. In the absence of
evidence proving actual copying, courts have allowed inferential show-
ings of copying, achieved by demonstrating both access and substantial
similarity between plaintiffs work and defendant's allegedly infringing
work. Although the test seems easy to apply, wrinkles occur where two
works contain similar or even identical nonprotectable elements.
Where this is the case, substantial similarity of expression is irrelevant
because the expression does not pass muster under section 10281 and
is thus not dispositive of copyright infringement.
Judge Hand's abstractions test is useful where expression is clear
from the literal text, as is the case with a traditional literary work like a
novel or play. The construct allows one to visualize a spectrum from
pure expression to pure idea. At the level of pure expression is the
verbatim copy of the play; at a level close to pure idea is its plot, e.g., a
love story. Somewhere in between is the line of copyrightability.
Problems arise here with software code. The literal code, i.e., the ac-
tual text of either the source code or the object code, is clearly protect-
able. But the nonliteral aspects of the code such as its structure,
sequence, organization, order, and selection of subroutines, present
difficulties. For a variety of reasons,82 some of these aspects are of du-
bious copyrightability because external constraints drive so much of
computer programming, and often do so at a level that is very close to
the literal expression in the code. The series of abstractions is short
before one runs head on into the doctrines of merger and scenes afaire.
But even if the line of originality hovers fairly close to the literal code,
many programs stretch into the megabyte83 range, so that there is un-
80 The latter tack, of course, is not available where direct copying has been proved by
plaintiff or conceded by defendant. See, e.g., id.; Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th
Cir. 1992).
81 Either it is unoriginal and fails under § 102(a), or it is of a nature forbidden by
§ 102(b), such as an idea, system, or procedure. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
82 See supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of doctrines that raise
hurdles establishing the copyrightability of program code.
83 A megabyte is one million bytes, or eight million bits. Most English words can be
represented in eight bytes, so that one megabyte translates roughly into 125,000 words, about
the length of a good-sized novel. See, e.g., Thomas A. Stewart, The Information Age in Charts,
FORTUNE, Apr. 4, 1994, at 79 (A human genome, which requires 750 megabytes to describe, is
tantamount to 399,000 pages of text.). But recall that programs are driven by efficiency, so
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doubtedly a good deal of protectable expression.
A. Computer Associates v. Altai
A workable solution to the weakness in the abstractions test was
provided in Computer Associates v. Altai,84 which puts forth the abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison (AFC) test. In the abstraction phase of the
test, the computer program is visualized in the manner of Judge
Hand's abstractions test: at the extreme end of expression lies the ex-
act computer code;85 at the idea end of the program lies its overall
purpose; 86 and in between are the functions of each subroutine, the
algorithms, data sets, and variable names.87 The necessary extension
ofJudge Hand's test is the filtration phase, which winnows out expres-
sion that is unprotectable in light of several copyright doctrines.88 In
the comparison phase, the remaining expression, which is protectable,
is compared to that in the allegedly infringing program. 89 A court
then determines whether the defendant has copied this expression
and weighs "the copied portion's relative importance with respect to
the plaintiff's overall program." 90 The protectable expression that re-
mains after filtration may not be much. The court called this remain-
der a "kernel."9' Analogizing the filtration process to sifting for gold,
one commentator noted that "[i]n many cases, the gold prospector will
be disappointed, finding nothing but worthless sand and pebbles. '92
The abstraction-filtration-comparison test has gained quick
acceptance.93
that the analogy to a novel is not very strong. An encyclopedia of short plot summaries is
perhaps a more accurate comparison.
84 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
85 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 707.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 702.
88 See supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.
89 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 706.
92 David I. Bainbridge, Computer Programs and Copyright: More Exceptions to Infringement,
56 Mon. L. Rav. 591, 592 n.7 (1993).
93 See Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc. 12 F.3d 527, 534 (5th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis of software has been "approved by
courts for sophisticated treatment of copyright cases"); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem.
Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[iln substantial part, we adopt the
'Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison' test. . . ."; and remanding the case to district court to
apply the filtration phase of the test in order to eliminate unprotectable elements, id. at 849);
Autoskill v. National Educ. Support Sys., 994 F.2d 1476, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1993) (analyzing
substantial similarity using the abstraction-filtration-comparison test on an appeal from pre-
liminary injunction, but not explicitly adopting it). But see Comprehensive Technologies
Int'l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 735 n.5 (4th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide
whether to adopt abstraction-filtration-comparison for copyright infringement analysis). The
test has made headway at the district court level as well. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (applying filtration).
The most important American case on reverse engineering of computer software, Sega
Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (1992), distinguishes Computer Associates on the ground
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The AFC test applies only when two programs are compared in
the process of determining whether one is substantially similar to the
other. A second problem occurs when evidence shows that the defend-
ant copied from the plaintiff's program directly, but limited copying
appears in the defendant's program. This situation may arise where
the defendant copies a program to learn of functional specifications or
ideas94 that are not evident in the object code.95 Because such copying
is not apparent in the defendant's final product, it is often called inter-
mediate copying.96 Most of the Computer Associates case deals with this
former problem: the court upheld the lower court's finding that de-
fendant's Oscar 3.5 was not substantially similar to plaintiff's CA
Scheduler.97 Evidence showed, however, that much of an earlier ver-
sion of defendant's program had been taken directly from plaintiff's
CA Scheduler.98 In this instance, the district court found that the de-
fendant had infringed plaintiffs copyright and awarded the plaintiff
over $360,000 in damages.99 The defendant did not contest the award
on appeal.100
B. Sega Enterprises v. Accolade
The case of direct copying seems straightforward, but is not for
many of the same reasons that complicate the substantial similarity
analysis. In Sega Enterprises v. Accolade,101 the defendant had written
video game programs for use on Sega's game console.10 2 For a game
to run on the console at all, however, the interface specifications 0 3 of
the console must be incorporated into the game program.10 4 Knowing
that this information had to be embodied within Sega's own video
games, Accolade's engineer's "wired a decompiler into the console cir-
cuitry, and generated printouts of the resulting source code."105 By
that substantial similarity analysis is based "solely on the degree of similarity between the
allegedly infringing work and the defendant's final product" and does not address the issue
of intermediate copying that is central in Sega. Id. at 1518-19. See infra notes 101-38 and
accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo Co., Ltd., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
95 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
96 Several cases deal with intermediate copying of standard literary works. See, e.g.,
Walker v. University Books, 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation
Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
97 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (9th Cir. 1992).
98 Id. at 700. Approximately 30% had been copied. Id.
99 Id. at 696.
100 Id. at 697.
101 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
102 Id. at 1514.
103 Interface specifications are information about the hardware on which the software is
to run. For example, data may be sent from the software to the microprocessor over any
number of channels (generally from eight to thirty-two). The number and location (ad-
dresses) of these channels must be incorporated into the software if it is to run properly.
104 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514.
105 Id. at 1515. For the operation of a decompiler, see supra text accompanying note 41.
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examining and modifying the source code of Sega's games, Accolade
was able to learn the console specifications and incorporate them into
its own games, which then ran on Sega's console.10 6
The reverse engineering process entailed making copies1 0 7 of
Sega's copyrighted video games,10 8 even though the final versions of
Accolade's games contained none of Sega's code beyond the interface
specifications.10 9 In its copyright action against Accolade, Sega alleged
not that Accolade's games were substantially similar to its own,' t0 but
that Accolade's "intermediate copies" of its games constituted an in-
fringement.' 1 1 The issue was one of first impression in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.11 2 The court rejected Accolade's argument that intermediate
copying did not constitute copyright infringement, 1 3 holding instead
that Accolade's reverse engineering of Sega's games was a fair use
under section 107.114
Section 107 is the copyright statute's fair use provision, which rec-
ognizes that some activities which infringe upon an author's exclusive
rights" 5 are nevertheless desirable. The classic example of fair use is a
newspaper's reproduction of excerpts from a copyrighted book for
purposes of review. While technically a violation of the right of repro-
duction, 1 16 the use of the book for this purpose is beyond reproach. 1
17
106 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515. Actually, Sega also included an initialization code (akin to a
password) in a newer version of its console, creating a second hurdle for Accolade's engi-
neers. The hurdle was not high: during the reverse engineering process, Accolade had spot-
ted a section of code in Sega's games that did not interact with the console. Accolade
correctly anticipated Sega's use of the code in a later console and made a note of it. Id. at
1515-16. This factual variation is immaterial to the decision.
107 The "printouts of resulting source code," id. at 1515, are either copies of Sega's pro-
grams, which are marketed only in object code form, or, more likely, derivative works. (ust
as Virgil's Aeneid may be translated from Latin into.English-or French-in many ways, so
may object code be translated into Pascal-or C-in many ways.) In either event, a copy-
right violation has occurred, either by violating Sega's right of reproduction or adaptation.
See id. at 1526 ("Disassembly of object code necessarily entails copying.") and 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(l), (2) (1988).
108 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1518, 1525 ("The record makes clear that disassembly is wholesale
copying.").
109 Id. at 1515.
110 They probably were not. Any similarities beyond the nonprotectable interface speci-
fications were at high levels of abstraction. Id. at 1516. Both companies, for example, mar-
keted football video games with the names of famous National Football League figures in
their titles. Id. at 1523 (Sega's Joe Montana Football and Accolade's Mike Ditka Power
Football).
11 Id. at 1517-18. Sega also sued for "trademark infringement and false designation of
origin .... " Id. at 1516. The copyright claim was actually included only in Sega's amended
complaint. Id.
112 Id. at 1519.
113 Id. at 1518-19. Accolade also argued that "disassembly" of object code was legal
under both 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (forbidding copyrights on ideas, processes, etc.) and under 17
U.S.C. § 117 (allowing computer users to copy programs into random access memory, which
is necessary to run the software). The court rejected each of these arguments. Id. at 1519-20.
114 Id. at 1520.
115 In the United States, the author's exclusive rights are those of reproduction, transla-
tion, distribution, performance, and display. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
116 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
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Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement, and section 107 speci-
fies the four factors to be weighed in a fair use analysis. These factors
are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
118
As to the amount of Sega's programs copied by Accolade, the
court held, the third fair use factor clearly cuts in Sega's favor: Acco-
lade copied the entire programs to discover their functional specifica-
tions. 119 The remaining three factors, however, favored Accolade. On
these, the court's analysis was driven by the special nature of computer
programs, particularly object code. As the court itself noted, "the key
to this case is that we are dealing with computer software, a relatively
unexplored area in the world of copyright law."1 20
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first statutory factor of fair use, its purpose and character,
runs in favor of those engaged in scholarship and research and against
those who copy for commercial gain. 121 The court found in favor of
the copier Accolade, noting that although Accolade's "ultimate" pur-
pose was commercial, its "direct" purpose in copying was "to study the
functional requirements for [console] compatibility." 122 Because the
case revolved on whether intermediate copying was illegal, the distinc-
tion is necessary: Accolade's use of Sega's games occurs at a relatively
early stage in program development. Conceptually, the development
of a computer program's source code may be seen in two stages-one
to write the purely expressive parts of the program, the other to ensure
that the interface between the software and the hardware is a good
117 Like every rule, however, this one has its exception: In Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), Nation magazine obtained a copy of former Presi-
dent Ford's memoirs, in which Time Magazine had exclusive rights, and published the parts of
it relating to the Nixon pardon first, thus scooping Time. The Supreme Court held that this
use of the work, which the Nation had purloined, did not qualify as a fair use. Id.
118 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
119 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526.
120 Id. at 1527. The court seems most troubled by the prospect of allowing ideas to
remain legally sealed within unreadable object code, which "defeats the fundamental pur-
pose of the Copyright Act-to encourage the production of original works by protecting the
expressive elements of those works while leaving the ideas, facts, and functional concepts in
the public domain for others to build on." Id.
121 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988). The commercial use of a work does not necessitate a
finding of infringement, or vice versa. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164
(1994) (holding that 2 Live Crew's version of Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman" was a parody
protected by fair use).
122 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522.
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one. In the second stage, the programmer's task is to make the
software operate according to the laws (specifications) of both the op-
erating system and the microprocessor.
For conventional works of literature, the distinction does not
make much sense because the "use" of the copier occurs at the level of
output, not an intermediate level.1 23 In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises,12 4 for example, Nation magazine reprinted sec-
tions of Ford's memoirs, 125 in which Time magazine had exclusive
rights. The Court concluded that the use was commercial 126 and held
for the plaintiff.12 7 In Sega, the court's identification of the precise
nature of Accolade's use reflects the realities of software production.
Perhaps more important is the court's reading of the fair use provi-
sions, which presuppose desirable uses such as scholarship and re-
search: "No other method of studying [the interface] requirements was
available to Accolade"1 28 other than decompilation.
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work'
In general, works of fiction receive greater protection than factual
works because the level of expression in them is higher.1 29 Another
way of stating this is that unprotectable expression (e.g., facts and
ideas) is less common in fictional works. The second statement has
implications for both factual and functional works, including com-
puter software.
The Sega court begins by stating its approval of the Computer Associ-
ates decision, noting that "many aspects of the program are not pro-
tected by copyright."1 30 Moreover, these unprotectable elements,
which are plainly visible when the work is a book or a play, are hidden
from the public when the work is a program marketed only in object
code.13 1 Disassembly or decompilation is thus "necessary... to under-
stand the functional requirements for [console] compatibility." 13 2 The
court held that the second fair use factor favored Accolade after facing
123 As the Sega court notes, most cases that touch on the issue of intermediate copying
hold only on the issue of whether defendant's final product infringes the plaintiffs copy-
right. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1518-19.
124 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
125 Verbatim passages of the memoirs accounted for 13% of the article that appeared in
the Nation. Id. at 548.
126 Id. at 562.
127 Id. at 569.
128 Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992).
129 See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991)
(citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)).
130 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1525.
131 Id. While it is true that some people are able to interpret object code, the court notes
that even experienced programmers cannot interpret an entire program in object code due
to its inordinate length. Even without a decompiler, then, copying the program is still neces-
sary. Id.
132 Id. at 1526.
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this fact about object code: "Sega's video game programs contain un-
protected aspects that cannot be examined without copying."133
3. Effect on Potential Market
The standard formulation of the fourth fair use factor-the po-
tential effect of the use on the market for plaintiffs work134 -is "if [the
challenged use] should become widespread, it would adversely affect
the potential market for the copyrighted work."135 Again the court
distinguished the intermediate use from the ultimate purpose of Acco-
lade's copying. Reverse engineering to learn Sega's interface specifica-
tion, the court held, "simply enables the copier to enter the market for
works of the same type as the copied work."1 36 The court states that
this is not tantamount to usurping the market for the first work, as was
the case in Harper & Row.137 In that case, the court notes, a person
wanting to read presidential memoirs would buy only one copy of
them, while video game users typically purchase many games. At bot-
tom, however, the court remained troubled by the use of object code
in light of the purposes of copyright. In its final observation on the
fourth fair use factor, the court states that the "attempt to monopolize
the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs counter
to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression . "... ,l38
V. EC Law
In the EC, the law governing the decompilation of computer
software is the European Council Directive of May 14, 1991, on the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs (Directive).139 Aimed at har-
monizing EC copyright law with respect to computer programs 40 and
at the smooth functioning of the EC software industry,14' the Directive
133 Id.
134 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
135 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984)).
136 Id.
137 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). See supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
138 Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24.
139 Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, Council Directive
91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter Directive]. The Directive was to have gone in effect
before January 1, 1993. Directive, supra, art. 10.1. As of March 1993, however, many EC
countries had not changed their laws to implement the Directive. See Europe Struggles with
Piracy Definitions, BYrE, Mar. 1993, at 30.
140 See Directive, supra note 139, pmbl., para. 4 ("[C] ertain differences in the legal protec-
tion of computer programs offered by the laws of the Member States have direct and negative
effect on the functioning of the common market .. ").
141 See Directive, supra note 139, pmbl., para. 10 ("[P]hysical interconnection and interac-
tion is required to permit all elements of software and hardware to work with other software
and hardware and with users in all ways in which they are intended to function."); id. para. 3
("[C]omputer programs are playing an increasingly important role in a broad range of indus-
tries and computer program technology can accordingly be considered as being of funda-
mental importance for the Community's industrial development.").
REVERSE ENGINEER SoFrwARE
allows the rightful possessor 42 of software to decompile it "to achieve
interoperability." 43 The right is constrained, however. First, there is
no right to decompile where "the information necessary to achieve in-
teroperability [is] readily available... .144 Second, decompilation may
not "be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of the
independently created computer program." 45 Third, the right is lim-
ited to "obtain[ing] the information," 146 which may not then "be used
for the development, production, or marketing of a computer pro-
gram substantially similar in its expression" to the original (decom-
piled) program.1 47 This last proscription is somewhat troubling. The
first part suggests that achieving interoperability is the only purpose for
which a program may be decompiled. If the limitation is complete,
then it would follow that the use of the decompiled information, to
develop any program, except to achieve compatibility, would be forbid-
den. Instead, the second part of the proscription says that the informa-
tion may not be used to develop a substantially similar program. The
Directive does not define the phrase "substantially similar," which is
pregnant with meaning in American copyright law. 148 Most likely the
second part of the proscription is overkill. Article 6.1 grants the right
of decompilation to rightful possessors, while Article 6.2 outlines the
limits of that right. Indeed, Article 6.2(a) circumscribes it entirely by
stating that the use of decompiled information is unlawful "other than
to achieve the interoperability of the independently created pro-
gram.' 4 9 Interoperability, much like compatibility, is "defined as the
ability to exchange information and mutually to use the information
which has been exchanged" and refers to "functional interconnection
and interaction,"' 50 which is necessary for "all elements of software
and hardware to work with other software and hardware.' 5 1 The Di-
rective specifies that those parts of a program which implement inter-
operability are "generally known as interfaces,"152  and limits
decompiling to those sections of the program. 53
142 "[L]icensee or... another person having a right to use a copy of a program .....
Directive, supra note 139, art. 6(1)(a).
143 Id. art. 6.1.b.
144 Id.
145 Id. art. 6.2.a.
146 Id. art. 6.1 (emphasis added).
147 Id. art. 6.2(c).
148 Where a plaintiff cannot show that the defendant copied directly, he may instead
show that defendant had access to his work and that the defendant's work is substantially
similar to the plaintiffs. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340
(1991).
149 Directive, supra note 139, art. 6.2(a).
150 Id. pmbl., para 12.
151 Id. pmbl., para. 10.
152 Id. pmbl., para. 11.
153 Id. art. 6.1.c. The provisions appear ineffective. The reason programmers decompile
software is that the object code is unintelligible streams of ones and zeros. As such, it offers
no clues as to the location of the interface sections. That is, the code -must first be decom-
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Perhaps one of the most striking features of the Directive is Article
9.1, which voids any contractual provision contrary to the provisions in
Article 6 (decompilation). Thus, the provisions in many American
shrink-wrap licenses that flatly prohibit any form of reverse engineer-
ing would be void in the EC.154 The provision will strike American
readers as odd because of the extent to which it goes beyond the pre-
emption laws. In the United States, federal copyright law preempts
state law only to the extent that the latter frustrates the former.155 But
preemption is a far cry from nullifying agreements between private
parties, who are free to modify, augment, or waive rights granted
under the federal copyright scheme.1 56
Aside from its decompilation and contractual provisions, the Di-
rective is a close approximation to American copyright law.1 57 This
should not be surprising. The EC "is fully committed to the promotion
of international standardization," 158 and the United States has the
most thorough and influential laws regarding the protection of com-
puter programs.15 9 Countries turn to U.S. law in high technology al-
piled before the location of the interface code can be found. Second, interface specifications
are often inherent within source code (with an eight-bit microprocessor, for example, an
integer variable may not take a value higher than 32,676), so that the code which offers
insight into interoperability may appear throughout a given program.
154 Decompilation, of course, is only one way to reverse engineer a program. Whether
the provisions in the shrink-wrap licenses that forbid reverse engineering would be void in
toto or merely blue penciled is an issue beyond the scope of this Comment.
155 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). Likewise in the EC,
"Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions
necessary to comply with this Directive before 1 January 1993." Directive, supra note 139, art.
10.1.
156 But see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that federal copyright law preempts those provisions of Louisiana's Software License Act that
allow software producers to forbid, via license, program adaptation via reverse engineering).
157 Art. 1.2 states that the Directive protects expression but not ideas or principles. Cf
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (no protection of "idea, procedure, process," etc.). Art. 4 grants
the copyright owner the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, and distribution. Cf 17
U.S.C. § 106 (rights of reproduction, creation of derivative works, and distribution). Art.
4(c) contains a first sale provision, which does not extend to the copy holder the right of
rental. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (Supp. III 1991) (general first sale doctrine) and
§ 109(b) (1) (A) (possessor of a program may not rent or lease it to others). Art. 5.1 allows
the user to make a copy of the program "necessary for [its] use," i.e., in RAM, without authori-
zation. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (copy allowed "as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program"). Art 5.2 allows the user to make a "back-up copy." Cf 17 U.S.C.
§ 117(2) (user allowed to make an "archival" copy).
The Directive is American in a significant omission: it does not mention moral rights,
despite the fact that they are protected in 10 of the 12 Member States. See Christopher Voss,
The Legal Protection of Computer Programs in the European Economic Community, 11 COMPUTER/L.J.
441, 443 n.13 (1992).
158 Directive, supra note 139, pmbl., para. 9.
159 "Governments in [foreign] countries look to the United States as a leader in this area
because our law is better developed; we've been pursuing case law in the software protection
area for much longer than most other nations." Symposium, Copyright Protection: Has Look
and Feel Crashed?, 11 CARwozo ARTs & Er. L.J. 721, 748 (1993) (quoting Anthony Lawrence
Clapes).
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most as a matter of course. 160
The biggest difference between U.S. and EC software law, how-
ever, is the treatment of fair use. The EC Directive, aside from the
narrow setting of interoperability, has no fair use provision. 161 By con-
trast, U.S. copyright law contains a general fair use provision that is
applied according to equitable principles. 162 Moreover, the latest
copyright decision handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court broadens
the scope of an important fair use factor 163 -the nature of the use.
164
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,165 the Court considered whether 2
Live Crew's version of Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman" was protected by
fair use. 16 6 In construing the first factor of fair use-"the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature"' 67 -the Court stated that the analysis should focus on
"whether and to what extent the new work is 'transformative.' "168 The
Court found in favor of fair use, reversing the 6th Circuit's decision
and criticizing its exclusive reliance on the commercial nature of the
remake.169
The Supreme Court's endorsement of examining the transforma-
tive nature of a work, rather than its commercial nature, is clearly sig-
nificant to reverse engineering. In Sega, defendant Accolade
manufactured entirely new video games, surely a transformation (ex-
cept for the initialization code) of Sega's original games. 170 The point
is not to outline the ramifications of Campbell, only to indicate that the
scope of fair use in the United States is elastic (and possibly growing)
in relation to that in the EC.
160 A recent English decision on computer software infringement turns to both the Sega
and Computer Assocs. cases for guidance on the nature and copyrightability of software. John
Richardson Computers, Ltd. v. Flanders, [1993] F.S.R. 497 (Eng. C.A.). Though handed
down two months after the EC Directive was to have gone in effect, the case does not even
mention it.
In Canada's updated copyright statute, the definition of "computer program" is taken
directly from the U.S. statute. Compare Copyright Act, R.S.C ch. 30, § 2 (1991)(Can.) with 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
161 See generally Directive, supra note 139.
162 See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
163 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
164 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
165 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
166 "It is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew's song would be considered an infringement
... but for a finding of fair use through parody." Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1169.
167 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
168 Campbell 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
169 Id. at 1173-74. "The mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not
insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more than the commercial nature of a use
bars a finding of fairness." Id. at 1174.
170 As to the fourth factor of fair use-the effect on the potential market-the Supreme
Court stated that 2 Live Crew's version of "Pretty Woman" would not affect the market for the
original "because the parody and the original usually serve different market functions." Id. at
1178. This may not be the case with most video games.
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VI. Conclusion
If Japan adopts the EC and U.S. position on reverse engineering
for the purpose of achieving functional compatibility, it will follow
through on its proposal despite U.S. resistance. Assuming Japan does
this, it is unclear how much leeway it will give to reverse engineers of
software. On one hand, U.S. law is more permissive than the EC Direc-
tive appears to be; on the other, Japanese copyright law has no fair use
provision,1 7 1 so that to create one now would be to leap into vast and
unchartered territory.
But reverse engineering in Japan, at least for purposes of achiev-
ing compatibility, is far less of a threat to the U.S. software industry
than the potential reach of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test at
home, which was designed as a guide for district courts in software
infringement cases. 172 Even with a broad right of reverse engineering,
a second comer has no guarantee that his eventual product will pass a
substantial similarity test. Had Accolade, for example, reverse engi-
neered and analyzed Sega's games in toto and then marketed nearly
identical games, a finding of infringement would have been nearly in-
evitable. The issue in Sega was merely whether Accolade's intermediate
copies were lawful under fair use. Substantial similarity analyses apply
to final products, which is a separate issue. Today, filtration analysis is
performed just prior to a court's comparison of protectable elements
of software. At the filtration stage, many venerable copyright doctrines
are applied to whittle away expression that is not protectable by copy-
right or that is not dispositive of copying.
These doctrines should be used with great care. In particular, the
scenes a faire doctrine, which disallows protection of shopworn conven-
tions, lends itself to abuse. As Judge Learned Hand pointed out, a
threadbare plot may be expressed in a variety of ways. 173 When apply-
ing the scenes a faire doctrine, courts should keep in mind that cliches
and conventions are often unoriginal only at the level of their ideas,
not their particular expression. The presence of a cliched scene or
section of code may not be dispositive of copying, but this is true only
so far as the scene or section is considered in its entirety. The scene
may permit a large number of possible expressions, so that excluding
plaintiff's particular expression from the substantial similarity analysis
is improper.
So, too, with a defendant's claims that efficiency is the supreme
dictator of program writing. Courts should demand an explanation of
171 See Teruo Doi, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACTICE (Melville B.
Nimmer & Paul Edward Geller eds., 1993).
172 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[W]e
think that district courts would be well-advised to undertake" the abstraction-filtration-com-
parison test.).
173 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
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efficiency when it is proffered as a defense. Does efficiency mean the
program's speed of execution? Or does it concern the way in which
information is presented to the user? Or that for a given task, the
source code version results in the least object code? My hunch is that
the more precise the definition of efficiency, the further the line of
copyrightability will lie from literal expression. That is, a vague notion
of efficiency will tend to bar protection of a greater variety of code.
On the other hand, as the definition of efficiency becomes more pre-
cise, it will eventually take on the look of a post hoc justification.
Courts should thus ask the additional question of exactly how impor-
tant is the goal of efficiency.
Courts should critically examine merger defenses as well. As a
practical matter, the merger defense has succeeded where the total
expression has been small and the purpose of the expression has been
well defined. 174 Today's typical program, by contrast, is planetary.
The expanding body of languages, commands, functions, and proce-
dures, which will continue to grow as microprocessors continue to ad-
vance, means that a task or idea may be implemented in an increasing
number of ways. Thus, the defense of merger should be met with
some skepticism.
Finally, courts should be careful not to conflate the analysis of pro-
tectable subject matter with that of what constitutes proper evidence of
copying. There is naturally a lot of overlap, but the distinction should
be kept in mind. As the inevitable Learned Hand noted, the fact that
an expression has its provenance in public domain material only weak-
ens the inference that copying occurred. 175 It does not destroy the in-
ference. The danger becomes apparent by imagining a database.
Facts are not copyrightable, 176 but compilations of facts are. Yet an
aggressive application of the filtration analysis to a database could
leave nothing for comparison analysis, thus, absolving a defendant
where his liability may be clear. The totality of the work would be
missed. Courts should be wary of attempts to nick and scratch a pro-
gram out of its legal existence.
At bottom, object code is functional, so that the copyright holder,
who obtained a monopoly only in its expression, should not complain
when others wish to examine its underlying ideas. But U.S. courts
should see to it that the expression gets the protection it deserves. The
world, including Japan, will be watching.
JOHN ESPENSHADE TITUS
174 See Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (instructions for
contest entry); Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (five facts about bonds).
175 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
176 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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